There is available an ever-increasing vari ety of procedures for managing uncertainty. These methods are discussed in the literature of artificial intelligence, as well as in the lit erature of philosophy of science. Heretofore these methods have been evaluated by intu ition, discussion, and the general philosoph ical method of argument and counterexam ple. Almost any method of uncertainty man agement will have the property that in the long run it will deliver numbers approaching the relative frequency of the kinds of events at issue. To find a measure that will pro vide a meaningful evaluation of these treat ments of uncertainty, we must look, not at the long run, but at the short or intermediate run. Our project attempts to develop such a measure in terms of short or intermediate length performance. We represent the effects of practical choices by the outcomes of bets offered to agents characterized by two un certainty management approaches: the sub jective Bayesian approach and the Class ical confidence interval approach. Experimental evaluation suggests that the confidence inter val approach can outperform the subjective approach in the relatively short run.
Introduction
Probability is the very guide of life, said Bishop But ler, and many agree. But what that comes to depends on what you mean by "probability". In the past there have been several clearcut interpretations of probabil ity to choose from: The subjective Bayesian view, ac cording to which a probability represents an individ ual's actual or idealised degree of belief [Savage, 1954] , the logical view, according to which the probability of
Choh Man Teng
Computer Science and Engineering University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia a statement, relative to a body of evidence, represents something like partial entailment, and is a relation be tween the evidence an individual has and that state ment (Carnap, 1950] , and the empirical view which in cludes as variants finite frequency [Russell, 1901] , lim iting frequency [Mises, 1957) , and measure-theoretic [Cramer, 1951) views according to which a probability statement is a claim about the world of the same gen eral character as a universal generalization or a law.
In recent years this neat trichotomy has become less sharp. Many writers seem to have decided that vague ness is the better part of· valor: One may ass ign probabilities to statements without specifying where the ass ignment comes from or what it comes towhether the source is logical measure or intuitive be lief, whether it is intended to be representational or normative.
From the point of view of the pure logician, this makes perfect sense: just as logic is not (in general) concerned to tell us what statements are true, but rather to spell out relations among truth assignments, so probabilis tic logic need not be concerned with the probability as signed to any particular statement, but only with the relations of probabilities assigned to statements in re lated groups -for example, an algebra of statements. There is thus a reasonable precedent for leaving the problem of interpreting probability to someone else.
2

There is an Issue
Despite the atmosphere of tolerance and good will (or perhaps fatigue) that currently surrounds questions of the interpretation of probability, there are important issues to be discussed, and perhaps even resolved. The issues are important because probability (or some mea sure of uncertainty) is central in decision making under the only circumstances we have access to.
There is no extrasystematic way of determining whether the probability assigned to a statement ( "Pe-ter's bike will not be stolen," "Susan's toss will land tails") is "correct" or not. By this we mean that the truth or falsity of the statement in question ("The bike is stolen," "The coin lands tails") cannot confirm or refute the probability we have assigned to it. The im probable happens (my bridge hand may consist of thir teen cards of the same suit) and what is almost cer tain to occur may not occur (a large fair sample may turn out to be totally misleading). Of course within some system we can confirm or refute the assignment of probabilities: the subjective Bayesian can examine his (or your) sincere propensity to bet; the logical the orist can compute the measures of the relevant mod els. However, any statement is either true in our one world, or false in it, and that is the end of the matter.
The truth or falsity of the single statement gives us no handle on its probability, no way of evaluating the probability claim.
A natural response is to say that while the truth or fal sity of a single statement says nothing about its prob ability, yet in the long run the relative frequency of truth in a class of statements of probability p ought to come close to p. But the connection between long run relative frequency of truth and probability is it self a probabilistic connection: we should expect that sometimes the highly probable turns out to be false.
The only way to make this connection tight is to adopt a frequency interpretation of probability, and that breaks the very connection we need: probability no longer applies to the single case.
What we are looking for is a way to evaluate the differ ent approaches to uncertainty that is more convincing than calling on conflicting intuitions. These would in clude not only different interpretations of probability, but also so-called non-probabilistic approaches such as Dempster/Shafer belief functions [Shafer, 1976] and possibility theory [Dubois and Prade, 1992] .
Here we will concentrate on comparing the subjective Bayesian approach and the classical confidence interval approach to probability.
Confidence methods bridge the gap between frequen cies and probabilities of particular cases by allowing us to accept (or to "fail to reject" ) , at a certain level of confidence, statistical hypotheses that impose interval constraints on long run frequencies. Thus, "in the long run" there is no difference between the two approaches. Presumably this is also true of any sensible alternative view -a view of probability that did not lead to convergence towards an observed frequency in a sequence of this sort in the long run would surely be strange. This is however not true of the short run. What we examine is whether the frequency-based probabilist is better off than the subjective Bayesian or vice versa in the short run.2 Although we know that they will come close to agreement in the long run, there may be a statistically significant difference in favor of one or the other in the short run.
One way to get at this is to have proponents of the two views bet with each other on a sequence of trials of an event with an unknown probability of success.3
Each would represent and update its own beliefs with respect to the interpretation of probability it adheres to, and place bets on the success of the trials accord ingly. The profit or loss from the bets on a (not very long) sequence of trials can then serve as an indicator of how well a particular approach works.
4
Rules of the Game
In this section we describe the set up of the game we used to evaluate the performance of the Bayesian and 2The confidence theorist does not need a very long run to get going: at a confidence of 0. 75 he can be confident that in a sample of two the sample ratio will differ by no more than 1/3 from the unknown parameter p.
3This was first suggested by Murtezaoglu in his disser
tation [M urtezaogl u, 1998 ].
Action buy sell hold Outcome heads tails The game consists of a sequence of tosses of a (possi bly biased) coin, whose chance of turning up heads is p. The two agents bet on the outcomes of the tosses according to their own estimates of the probability of heads. Before each toss, a random price $t between $0 and $1 is posted as the price of a ticket that will return $1 if the next toss is heads, and nothing oth erwise. We make a market in those tickets: that is, we are willing to buy or sell any number of tickets at price $t. A new randomly generated price is adopted for each new trial.
Given the ticket price $t for a trial, Bayes and Conf each has three options: buy a ticket at price $t, sell a ticket at price $(1-t), or hold (decline to participate in this trial). The payoffs are given in Table 1 .
4.1
Belief Representation
The two players represent their beliefs differently.
Bayes represents its belief by a beta distribution, which is a commonly assumed subjectivist distribu tion and one that is easy to update. always has an exact probability, and so can always choose a bet with the maximum expectation. On the other hand, Conf is almost sure to start the sequence by declining all bets, until it has accumulated some knowledge of the distribution. We have chosen to take account of this by allowing each player to bet no more than m times on the n tosses.
For each trial, each has to decide whether to use a token or not on the spot, and once we have moved on to the next toss, they cannot change their minds about decisions made for the previous tosses and go back to bet on a previously declined trial. This eliminates strategies that require global planning or lookahead, such as choosing the m trials whose ticket prices are the most extreme among the n trials.
This presents an added complication for Bayes: Bayes must decide, on each toss, whether to bet on that toss or to save its bet until later when it (presumably) has a "better" posterior probability on which to base its bet. Conf follows a simpler algorithm, but faces the prospect of not being able to use all of its m bets.
To simplify matters we have supposed that Bayes will bet on the last m of the n opportunities to bet, and that Conf will simply bet whenever it reasonably can.
To compensate for these difficulties we have varied the number of bets m as a fraction of the number of op portunities n.
Preliminary Evaluation
We set up the game using the following parameters. Table 2 : Net profit per allowed bet, varying the num ber of trials n (m = 0.5n, a= 0.1, priors=beta(1, 1)). Table 3 : Net profit per allowed bet, varying the num ber of tokens m (n == 20, a== 0.1, priors==beta(1, 1)).
they do not even know its value; otherwise they would not be applying various methods to update their be liefs about p. The entries under "Overall" in Tables 2 to 5 show the net profits per allowed bet averaged over all settings of p, giving an indication of the overall per formance of the agents across a wide range of chance of heads.
In the very short run (n = 3, Table 2 ), the net prof its were low for all three players, but they increased with the length of the run n, very quickly at the be ginning and then slower (and possibly flattened out) when n became large. Conf started out much lower than Bayes and Sample, but overtook them both as n was increased to the 10-20 range. We can expect that Conf does not bet much at the beginning, when its confidence interval is close to [0, 1] . An initial (not very long) sequence is needed to successively refine its interval estimate before bets can be placed effectively. 
More Thoughts
Speaking generally, Sample and Bayes had compara ble performance, while Conf appeared to obtain higher returns in quite a few cases. Although Conf bet less often, on average the yield per actual bet was higher.
However, the differences in performance could also partially be attributed to the way the experiment was set up. Sample and Bayes are always ready to bet, while Conf has to skip some of the trials if the ticket price falls within the bounds of its confidence interval.
By imposing a limited number of tokens that could be used to place a bet, the playing field was somewhat lev elled so that all players would place an approximately equal number of bets. ( Conf might still place fewer bets if there were not enough "good" trials.)
We can consider setting other rules for the game. Sup pose Conf is forced to bet? "Force" implies sanctions;
sanctions imply value. The value involved in the sanc tion distorts the odds. The way to handle this is to allow Conf to refrain from buying and selling tickets, but to charge it a small penalty every time it exer cises this option. This will increase the number of bets placed by Conf, while retaining the choice to decline to bet if necessary. The effects of imposing a penalty might be similar to that of decreasing the level of con-fidence 1 -a in some cases, but it provides a more flexible way to manage the betting criterion.
We have shown that the confidence interval approach can outperform the subjective Bayesian approach in quite a broad range of circumstances. It should be noted that this is not a question involving differences of parameters, as it would be if one approach were su perior when the actual relative frequency is close to 0, and the other were superior when the actual relative frequency is close to 0.5. The differences appear to be quite global. The results suggest that confidence methods, involving the acceptance or rejection of fam ilies of statistical hypotheses, can offer practical ad vantages over purely probabilistic methods. Not only do Bayesian methods require the assumption of a prior probability (often hard to justify), but there appears to be a practical difference in return between updat ing the "uninformative" prior by conditionalization, and updating (pruning) the set of possible distribu tions by the application of confidence methods at a certain level of confidence. This suggests that the role of acceptance is not that of providing a rough short hand for probabilistic updating, but more important and fundamental.
Further work needs to be done to characterize more precisely the circumstances under which one approach is better than the other, by taking account of a more finely articulated Bayesian strategy. We should also be able to extend this method of performance measure to evaluate other approaches to uncertainty.
